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ABSTRACT 
With a sample of 354 U.S. large bank holding companies, this paper investigates the 
determination of financial distress in financial institutions. We find that: (1) the house price 
index is consistently significant and positively associated with the Distance-to-Default (DD) 
measure in the U.S. banking market; (2) all the three major banking risk characteristics i.e. 
non-performing loans, short-term wholesale funding, and the credit-risk indicator are 
reliable factors behind DD determination; (3) for the two alternative measures of BHC 
activity diversification, non-interest income is positively related with BHCs’ DD whereas 
off-balance-sheet activity is negatively associated to the financial distress measure; and (4) 
Relevant capital requirements indicators including Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Total 
Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Tier I Leverage Ratio should be taken in regulatory assessment of 
BHCs’ financial distress. 
Key Words: Bank Holding Company; Distance-to-Default; Financial distress; Bank regulation; 
Capital requirements; Non-interest income; Off-balance-sheet activities. 
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Determinants of Financial Distress in U.S. Large Bank 
Holding Companies  
1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed that many large U.S. financial institutions failed or came 
close to failing due to their lending practices and trading behaviour (Allen, Babus, and 
Carletti, 2009; Laeven, 2011). Such failures have triggered a sharp contraction in both 
advanced and emerging economies, and the government rescues associated with these 
failures have given rise to substantial fiscal costs (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). These 
events highlight the critical importance of understanding the determinants of financial 
distress of large financial institutions in the promotion of financial stability. Because 
almost all U.S. banking assets are controlled by bank holding companies (BHCs) 
(Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery, 2012), this paper focuses on BHCs for the study of 
the determinants of large financial institutions’ default risk. 
 
Recent studies of the general issue of the BHCs can be found, for example in 
Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012), Copeland (2012), Cetorelli, Mandel, 
Mollineaux (2012), and Adams and Mehran (2003). Other studies that examine a 
variety of aspects of BHCs include Ashcraft (2008) that investigates if bank holding 
companies are a source of strength to their banking subsidiaries. Curry, Fissel, and 
Hanweck (2008) assess if BHC risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased 
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over the business cycles. Elyasiani and Wang (2008) examine the relation between 
asymmetry of BHCs and their non-interest income diversification. Cornett, McNutt, 
Tehranian (2009) probe the impact of corporate governance on earnings management 
in the U.S. BHCs. Studies on BHC diversification can be seen in Elyasiani and Wang 
(2012) and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013). However, while studies on various 
aspects on bank holding companies have well advanced, few studies investigate what 
drives financial distress of bank holding companies, and the implications for financial 
regulations. 
 
In this paper, we use a sample of selected 354 BHCs with 2288 observations of 
firm-years during 2003 to 2012 to investigate the effects of various factors on 
financial distress in terms of default risk in U.S. large BHCs. Default risk is the 
uncertainty surrounding a firm’s ability to serve its debts and obligations (Crosbie and 
Kocagil, 2003). The approach that we use in measuring the default risk is the index of 
‘Distance to Default’ (DD), originally derived from the models of Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1974). These original models have been well extended to 
investigating various bankruptcy-related problems (for recent review studies, see 
Sundaresan, 2000; Jarrow, 2009; and Sundaresan 2013).  
 
The determining factors behind US BHCs’ financial distress are to be investigated in 
our tests for the four hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, we use the housing price 
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index to test whether the DD of BHCs is positively associated with the pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic conditions. In the second hypothesis, we employ three important 
measures of BHC risk characteristics, i.e. the non-performing loan ratio, net 
charge-off ratio (the measure of credit risk), and short-term wholesale funding, to 
investigate their relations with the DD measure. The third is to use three alternative 
capital requirements, i.e. the Tier I risk-based capital ratio, total risk-based capital 
ratio, Tier I leverage ratio, to examine their linkages with the DD index. The fourth is 
to employ two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification, i.e. the 
non-interest income, and the off-balance-sheet activity to test whether they are 
negatively associated with DD. We control five variables, including the four variables 
in the first two hypotheses and the size factor, in our empirical estimation. Based on 
this, we deploy three alternative measures of regulatory capital requirements and two 
alternative proxies of BHC activity diversification to run 6 multivariate regressions 
with various sample periods, including the periods of 2003-12, 2003-06, 2007-08, and 
2009-12, respectively. 
 
Our main findings show that (1) the housing price index is always statistically 
significant determinant and is positively associated with the DD index, implying that 
as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions, it critically drives financial distress of U.S. 
BHCs; (2) the three measures of BHC risk characteristic i.e. the non-performing loan 
ratio, the measure of credit risk, and short-term wholesale funding can be taken as the 
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reliable indicators for determinants of the DD measure. Additionally, the short-term 
wholesale funding is found to be a significant factor exhibiting interconnectedness 
between financial institutions and their exposures to liquidity risk; (3) the two 
alternative measures of BHC activity diversification show no consensus in 
determining default risk: non-interest income is positively associated with BHCs’ DD, 
which is on the contrary to our expectation, whereas the off-balance-sheet activity is 
negatively related to DD; and (4) for the three regulatory capital requirements, they 
are all statistically significant implying that they are good indicators of the degree of 
BHCs’ default risk. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
bank holding companies. Section 3 develops the hypotheses that we will examine and 
also specifies our default risk model and the econometric formulation. Section 4 
discusses the data and provides conventional descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
the empirical findings and their analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
As a corporation controlling one or more banks, a large U.S. parent BHC typically 
engages a broader range of banking and non-banking activities (Avraham, Selvaggi, 
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and Vickery, 2012). In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)1 amended the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)2, the primary legislation delineating the 
allowable scope of BHC activities. Under the GLBA, a BHC is allowed to register as 
a financial holding company (FHC), and may engage in a broad range of activities  
from insurance underwriting, securities underwriting and dealing, to merchant 
banking (Elyasiani and Wang, 2012). Avraham et al. (2012) illustrate that, at the end 
of 2011, almost all U.S. banking assets were governed by bank holding companies. In 
total, U.S. BHCs controlled over $15 trillion in total assets at that time. 
 
In recent studies on BHCs, Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012) provide a 
structural view of U.S. BHCs, depicting their organizational structures, the size, 
complexity, and diversity of these organizations, and outlining the different types of 
regulatory data filed by the Federal Reserve for U.S. BHCs. From an income 
perspective, Copeland (2012) explores BHCs’ income from 1994 to 2010, using 
detailed income data from the Federal Reserve Y-9C regulatory filings. He finds that 
large BHCs have become more diverse over time, due to the fact that they have 
developed new sources of income by delivering new financial services, and concludes 
that the transformation of the U.S. financial sector has had a considerable impact on 
BHCs over the last two decades. Cetorelli, Mandel, and Mollineaux (2012) probe the 
                                                          
1 See Furlong (2000) for a detailed discussion on the GLBA. 
2 See Klebaner (1958) for a detailed discussion on the BHCA. 
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evolution of U.S. banks and financial intermediation from the view of bank holding 
companies, and suggest an analytical frame of principles and guidelines for 
monitoring and identifying future transformations in the U.S. financial system. Adams 
and Mehran (2003) investigate the systematic differences between the governance of 
banking and manufacturing firms, and find that the governance structures of banking 
are industry-specific. 
 
Ashcraft (2008) investigates whether BHCs are a source of strength to their banking 
subsidiaries. The findings show that a bank affiliated with a multi-bank holding 
company (MBHC) is much safer than a stand-alone bank or a bank affiliated with a 
one-bank holding company. The MBHC affiliation can mitigate the probability of 
future financial distress, and that the distressed affiliated banks tend to receive capital 
injections more readily, recover more quickly, and are not subject to failure over the 
subsequent year. Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008) evaluate whether BHC risk 
ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over business cycles during the 
1986-2003 period, and conclude that bank exam ratings display inter-temporal 
characteristics. Elyasiani and Wang (2008) probe the issues between asymmetry of 
BHCs and their non-interest income diversification, and find that the more diversified 
the non-interest income activities of BHCs are, the more information asymmetry there 
is, making BHCs more opaque and curtailing their value. Cornett, McNutt, and 
Tehranian (2009) investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms impact on 
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earnings and earnings management at the largest publicly traded U.S. BHCs. They 
suggest that performance, earnings management, and corporate governance are 
endogenously determined. Elyasiani and Wang (2012) examine whether BHC 
diversification can improve or impair their production efficiency. They conclude that 
technical efficiency is negatively associated with BHCs’ diversified activities.  
 
Bennett, Güntay, and Unal (2012) evaluate the relation between the structure of 
CEO’s compensation package and the default risk and performance of U.S. BHCs in 
the context of the recent global financial crisis. Their results show that, compared to 
inside equity measures, inside debt can be taken as a better indicator of both the 
BHC’s performance and default risk. Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) assess dividend 
payouts of 462 U.S. BHCs before and during the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Their 
results have implications both for corporate and governance theories and for the 
regulatory forms. Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013) examine the effect of the 
geographic diversification of BHC assets across the U.S. on their market valuations. 
Their findings show that exogenous increases in geographic diversity reduce BHC 
valuations, and that geographic diversification of BHC assets increases insider 
lending and reduces loan quality. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) use the U.S. BHC data 
over the period 1995 to 2010 to construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure 
the strength and independence of the risk management function of BHCs. They find 
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that, all else being equal, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and 
higher return on assets. 
 
Although various issues regarding BHCs have been researched, there are few studies 
examining the determinants of default risk in bank holding companies, a very 
important issue that can provide critical insights on how to improve the regulation of 
key segment of the financial sector. In this light, we investigate the effects of various 
factors driving the movements of distance-to-default as proxy for default risk to find 
the determinants of financial distress in large U.S. BHCs. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development and Model Specification 
 
3.1. Hypothesis Development 
Based on the literature in the field, we construct the four hypotheses as follows. 
 
1. The Business Cycle Hypothesis (H1): As a pro-cyclical macroeconomic factor, 
housing prices are positively related to the distance-to-default of BHCs. 
 
In this hypothesis, the default risk is associated with the macroeconomic state of the 
economy. Following Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012), we use housing prices as 
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the proxy. They show that, in the country location of the assessed bank, housing 
prices have the property to capture business cycles driving asset prices.  
 
2. Risk Characteristic Hypothesis (H2): Indicators of BHC risk characteristics such 
as the non-performing loan ratio, net charge-off ratio, and short-term wholesale 
funding are negatively related to the distance-to-default. 
 
Existing studies have investigated the impact of BHC risk characteristics on its default 
risk, performance, or executive compensation. Bennett et al. (2012) find that higher 
levels of non-performing assets/total asset ratio are negatively associated with the 
distance-to-default measure. Deng and Elyasiani (2008) use the net charge-off ratio 
(net charge-offs on loans and leases/total loans) as an indicator of credit risk in their 
valuation and risk models. Balboa, López-Espinosa, and Rubia (2012) probe whether 
the factor causing increases in systemic risk in the banking industry, i.e. short-term 
wholesale funding, could arise from the desire of bank managers to increase their 
variable compensation, and find that this factor is positively related to high levels of 
variable compensation. Balboa et al. (2012) also suggest that short-term wholesale 
funding is unstable, which can be taken to imply interconnectedness among financial 
institutions and exposures to liquidity risk. In these lights, our hypothesis employs all 
the three BHC risk characteristics, i.e. non-performing loan ratio, net charge-off ratio 
as the measure of credit risk, and short-term wholesale funding, as the control variable, 
to investigate whether these factors can affect DD. 
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3. Capital Requirement Hypothesis (H3): BHCs’ capital requirement measures, 
including the Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio, 
and the Tier I Leverage Ratio, are positively associated with their 
distance-to-default. 
 
A U.S. BHC needs to report three separate capital ratios to the regulator: the Tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio, Total risk-based capital ratio, and Tier I leverage ratio, 
whereby the regulator determines whether the bank is well-capitalized, adequately 
capitalized, or under-capitalized3 (Kisin and Manela, 2013). In our hypothesis, we 
use these three regulatory capital ratios as the alternative capital requirements to test 
the relation between them and the distance-to-default. 
 
4. Activity Diversification Hypothesis (H4): The diversified activities of BHCs such 
as reflected in non-interest income, or off-balance-sheet activity are negatively 
associated with their distance-to-default. 
 
Over the last two decades, the activities of financial institutions have diversified 
considerably, shifting from traditional ones (borrowing and lending) toward related 
activities, e.g., proprietary trading and private OTC market-making services (Flannery, 
                                                          
3 According to Kisin and Manela (2013), a bank is regarded as well-capitalized if all of the following 
are true: 
a. Core capital (leverage) ratio Tier 1 (core) capital as a percentage of average total assets - 
ineligible intangibles  3% to 5% depending on its composite CAMELS rating; 
b. Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio  Tier 1 (core) capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets  6%; 
Total risk-based capital ratio  Total risk-based capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets  10%. 
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2012). Many studies have examined various aspects of BHC activity diversification. 
Some related studies investigate the issue of non-interest income. For example, Stiroh 
(2004) reports that between 1984 and 2001, non-interest income, i.e. the revenue 
associated with trading and advising activities, expanded from 25% to 43% of total 
revenue of U.S. commercial banks. Related studies are Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and 
Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012). Other studies probe the issue of banks’ 
off-balance-sheet activity. Minton, Williamson, and Stulz (2005) investigate whether 
the use of credit derivatives by U.S. BHCs can reduce bank risk, finding that a small 
group of banks that uses credit derivatives seems not to increase the soundness of 
these banks. Li and Marinč (2013) assess the effect of financial derivatives on the 
systematic risk of publicly listed BHCs in the U.S., and find that greater use of credit 
derivatives reflects higher systematic credit risk. Deng and Elyasiani (2008) employ 
the ratio of notional principal on interest rate contracts to total assets as the measure 
of off-balance-sheet activity risk for their hypothesis testing. In our hypothesis, we 
use the non-interest income ratio and off-balance-sheet activity as alternative 
measures of BHC activity diversification to test the linkage between them and the DD 
measure. 
 
3.2. Model Specification 
 
3.2.1. The default risk model 
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To identify our dependent variable, we follow Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974) to calculate the distance-to-default as our default risk measure. The assumption 
of the Merton model suggests that the market value of assets tA  follows a random 
log-normal process expressed by: 
 / ,t t A AA A t t            (1) 
where A  is the expected return and A  is the volatility of assets. According to the 
Black-Scholes pricing of call options, the value of equity tE  at any time t prior to 
the maturity can be written as: 
( )
1 2( ) ( )
r T t
t tE A N d Le N d
         (2) 
where r  is the risk-free rate, L  is the book value of the firm’s debt, and T  is the 
maturity time. The terms 1d  and 2d  are calculated by: 
   2
1
1
ln /
2
t A
A
A L r T t
d
T t


 
   
 

      (3) 
2 1 Ad d T t         (4) 
 
The Black-Scholes pricing in (2) can provide the linkage between the volatility of 
equity and the volatility of assets through Ito’s Lemma: 
1( )
t
E A
t
A
N d
E
 
 
  
 
      (5) 
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The Merton model implies that the current value of assets 0A  and its volatility A  
can be derived from the two equations (2) and (5) with 0t  . 
 
As a result, the distance-to-default (DD), the number of standard deviations away 
from the default point, can be given by: 
  20
1
ln /
2
A A
A
A L T
DD
T
 

 
  
        (6) 
A bank defaults or is bankrupt when 0DD   
 
3.2.2. The econometric specification 
 
For our independent variables, we first introduce the control variables. Five control 
variables are considered. First, we use the U.S. housing price index (HPI) to examine 
the first hypothesis – business cycle hypothesis (H1). Then, we employ the natural log 
of the total assets of BHCs (Size) to detect whether the size effect exists. Next, we use 
the three important indicators showing BHC risk characteristics, i.e. the short-term 
wholesale funding ratio (STWF), non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and net 
charge-off ratio (CR), as control variables in our testing of the second hypothesis – 
Risk Characteristic Hypothesis (H2). 
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We use the three alternative capital requirements, i.e. the Tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio (Tier1), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) 
to examine the third hypothesis (H3). Finally, we employ the two alternative measures 
of BHC activity diversification, i.e. the non-interest income ratio (NIN), and 
off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA), to test the fourth hypothesis (H4). 
 
OLS estimator is used to expound the determinants of the DD measure. The empirical 
model is specified in the following equation: 
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , ,3 4
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
DD HPI Size STWF
NPLR CR H H
   
    
      
        
   (7)                                                             
where i denotes the bank and t shows the period. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1. Data and Variable Definitions 
 
Our sample selection procedure is as follows. We first select the 860 U.S. bank 
holding companies whose total assets exceed 1 billion U.S. dollars for the period from 
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2003 to 2012, as listed in the FR Y-9C form4 – the quarterly report BHCs file to the 
regulatory authorities. From these 860 BHCs, we delete those that are private 
companies or miss important data, to finally obtain a total of 354 BHCs with 2288 
observations, i.e. firm-years. The sample finally chosen is from 2003Q4 to 2012Q4, 
covering before, during, and after the recent global financial crisis. We retain the 
fourth-quarter figures from the FR Y-9C form as the basis for the annual figures. 
 
To calculate the DD measure, the daily share prices of our selected BHCs from 2003 
to 2012 are downloaded from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database, the yearly debt data for that period from Compustat, and the daily risk-free 
rate over the same period from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
 
Table 1 shows the variables used and their construction. All variables except housing 
price index and distance-to-default are obtained from FR Y-9C forms. In the table, the 
symbol within the brackets after each variable corresponds to the symbol shown in the 
regression results. 
<Table 1 here> 
                                                          
4 FR Y-9C is a regulatory report showing Consolidated Financial Statements of Bank Holding 
Companies. Our BHC database based on FR Y-9C is downloaded from the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm 
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4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of all variables for our selected BHCs, 
during the periods 2003-2012, 2003-2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009-2012. All 
descriptive results are expressed in percentage, except Observations, DD, and Size. 
We can see from this Table that before the financial crisis, i.e. from 2003 to 2006, the 
maximum value of DD is 18.86, the mean of DD is 7.37, and the median of DD is 
7.11; while during the crisis, in 2007 the maximum is 15.66, the mean is 3.21, and the 
median is only 2.82. In 2008 the maximum is only 5.93, the mean is just 1.19, and the 
median is only 1.22. In the aftermath of the recent crisis, i.e. during the period 
2009-2012, the maximum value of DD has surged to 36.70, the mean value has gone 
back to 4.01, and the median is 3.75. In addition, the statistics of housing price index 
(HPI) are highly related to those of DD. Table 2 also shows that the selected BHCs 
have relatively stable size before, during and after the recent financial crisis. 
<Table 2 here> 
Table 3 illustrates the Correlation Matrix among all the dependent and independent 
variables used for our selected BHCs during the period 2003-2012. We can see from 
this Table that DD is highly positively related to the housing price index (0.630), and 
positively related to the three regulatory capital ratios, i.e. Tier I risk-based capital 
ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV). 
Whereas, the DD measure is negatively related to all three BHC risk characteristics, 
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i.e. the short-term wholesale funding ratio (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio 
(NPLR), and the measure of credit risk (CR). For the two alternative measures of 
BHC activity diversification, i.e. the non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the 
off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA), DD is positively related to the first and 
negatively related to the second. In addition, OBSA is positively related to STWF, but 
slightly negatively related to NPLR and CR. NPLR is highly positively related to CR. 
Tier I is highly positively associated with the other two alternative capital 
requirements, i.e. TRBCR and LEV.  
<Table 3 here> 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Univariate Regression Results 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results derived using univariate models, which test all 
variables separately, for the period from 2003 to 2012. From Table 4, we can see that 
the housing price index (HPI) is statistically significant, indicating the positive 
linkage with the distance-to-default measure. Size is statistically significant, also 
indicating a positive relation with the DD measure. The three indicators of BHC risk 
characteristics, i.e. STWF, NPLR, and CR, are all statistically significant, showing the 
negative linkage with the DD measure. The two alternative measures of BHC activity 
diversification yield different results: the non-interest income ratio (NIN) is positively 
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related to the DD measure in a statistically significant manner; while the 
off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) is negatively related to DD. The distinct 
outcomes of these two alternative measures seem to show the complexity of the 
selected BHCs. For the three alternatives of regulatory capital requirement, Tier I 
leverage ratio (LEV) is positively related to DD in a statistically significant manner, 
as we expected. The Tier I capital ratio (Tier I) and Total risk-based capital ratio 
(TRBCR) have the same influence on the DD measure. 
<Table 4 here> 
 5.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
 
In this part, we derive the multivariate regression results for the determinants of the 
DD measure of the selected BHCs during the periods 2003-2012, 2003-2006, 
2007-2008, and 2009-2012. Table 5 shows the multivariate regression results during 
the full sample period. Six multivariate regressions are conducted with the three 
alternative measures of regulatory capital requirements and the two alternatives of 
BHC activity diversification. From column 1 to column 3, in addition to our five 
control variables, we hold the non-interest income ratio (NIN), and run the regressions 
by changing the three alternatives of regulatory capital requirements. From column 4 
to column 6, we hold the off-balance-sheet activity ratio (OBSA) and perform the 
same steps as for the first six columns.  
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According to Table 5, the housing price index (HPI) is statistically significant in all 
regression results, showing the strongly positive linkage with the DD measure. The 
statistic results of Size indicate that there exists a positive size effect on the BHCs’ 
distance-to-default. The three important indicators of BHC risk characteristics, i.e. 
STWF, NPLR, and CR, are all statistically significant, showing the negative 
relationship with the DD measure, as we expected. The three alternative measures of 
regulatory capital requirements, i.e. LEV, Tier I, and TRBCR, are also statistically 
significant, suggesting their positive linkages with DD. However, of the two 
alternative measures of BHC activity diversification, i.e. NIN and OBSA, while 
OBSA is statistically significant, showing the negative linkage with DD, the 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) is positively related to DD in a statistically significant 
manner. 
<Table 5 here> 
Using the same steps as in Table 5, Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the multivariate 
regression results for the periods before the recent crisis, i.e. 2003-06; during the 
crisis, i.e. 2007-08; and after the crisis, i.e. 2009-12, respectively. Comparing Table 6 
with Table 7, with exception of the non-interest income ratio (NIN), all the other 
independent variables have similar association with the BHCs’ DD in the two selected 
periods. Unlike NIN in Table 5, the non-interest income ratio (NIN) in Table 6 is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that this measure of BHC activity diversification 
had no effect on the BHCs’ DD before the recent financial crisis.  
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<Table 6 here> 
For the recent 2007-08 crisis period, Table 7 shows that the housing price index 
remains statistically significant, implying the importance of macroeconomic 
conditions for financial institutions. The three measures of BHC risk characteristics, 
i.e. STWF, NPLR, and CR, are consistently statistically significant, illustrating the 
negative relation with the BHCs’ DD measure. There is no clear size effect on DD 
during the crisis period. Comparing Table 7 with Table 5, NIN in Table 7 has the 
same effect as in Table 5. But during the crisis time OSBA shows a statistically 
insignificant relation with the DD measure. For the three alternative measures of 
capital requirements, when holding OBSA all the three are statistically significant, but 
when holding NIN, only the Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I) is significant. 
<Table 7 here> 
Comparing Table 8 with Table 5, with the exception of Size, all the other independent 
variables have the same impact on the BHCs’ DD in both the post-crisis period and 
the full sample period. Table 8 shows that the three measures of BHC risk 
characteristics can be taken as reliable indicators for determination of the DD measure. 
Also, the three alternatives of capital ratio can be regarded as reliable regulatory 
capital requirements. NIN is significantly positively related to the DD measure. 
OBSA performs better in determining DD in the post-crisis period than during the 
crisis. 
<Table 8 here> 
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5.3 Possible Policy Implications from our Results 
 
From a policy perspective, our empirical results provide several implications for 
financial regulation. First, for macro-prudential risk, our results indicate that housing 
prices are an important factor that the monetary policy and macro-prudential policy 
must take into consideration, as shown in Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012). Our 
univariate regression results in Table 4 suggest that an unexpected 1% fall in the 
housing prices may decrease DD by 0.37 standard deviations, suggesting the 
significant impact of housing prices on financial institutions’ financial distress. 
 
Second, for liquidity risk, short-term wholesale funding can be considered a reliable 
factor exhibiting interconnectedness between financial institutions and exposures to 
liquidity risk. Some studies, such as Acharya and Richardson (2012) and Greenwood 
and Scharfstein (2013), show that short-term wholesale funding is an important factor 
reflecting systemic risk, which is also considered a vital factor for formulating related 
provisions within the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, i.e. the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
Third, with regard to activity diversification risk, our two diversity measures do not 
show the same effect on determining default risk. On the one hand, the statistically 
significant results on non-interest income show that it is positively related to the 
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BHCs’ DD, which is contrary to the prediction of studies such as Stiroh (2004) and 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006). However, recent studies such as Köhler (2013) suggest 
that the impact of non-interest income on risk hinges on the business mode of a bank. 
More specifically, Köhler (2013) implies that banks with a retail-oriented business 
mode become significantly more stable with the increase in their share of non-interest 
income; whereas investment-oriented banks become significantly less stable. Thus, it 
seems from our results that the positive relationship between non-interest income and 
DD shows the complexity of our examined bank holding companies. On the other 
hand, off-balance-sheet activity can be used as a reliable factor for detecting the 
default risk of BHCs, which is in line with the stringency of provisions related to 
off-balance-sheet exposures within the Dodd-Frank Act (Acharya and Richardson, 
2012). 
 
Fourth, for regulatory capital requirements, the statistically significant results of our 
three measures of capital requirements imply that they are good indicators for the 
investigation of BHCs’ default risk. However, there is ongoing debate as to whether 
capital requirements alone are the best tool of management of systemic risk for 
financial institutions. For example, studies such as Admati et al. (2010) and Duffie 
(2012) suggest that only capital requirements can manage the systemic risk of banks, 
while Acharya and Richardson (2012) imply that both capital requirements and 
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restrictions on asset holdings (e.g. using the Volcker rule within the Dodd-Frank Act) 
can effectively manage the systemic risk of financial institutions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use a sample of 354 bank holding companies in the U.S. to probe the 
impact of various factors on the financial distress of BHCs, before, during and after 
the recent financial crisis. Our empirical model specification incorporates five 
variables as the determinants of large BHCs’ DD measure, including the housing 
price index, size, the non-performing loan ratio, the measure of credit risk (net 
charge-off ratio), and the short-term wholesale funding ratio. In the modeling process, 
the first is used to proxy for pro-cyclical economic conditions and the last three 
capture different aspects of BHC risk characteristic. Additionally, we employ two 
measures of BHC activity diversity and three alternative measures of regulatory 
capital requirements. Our main findings are: First, the housing price index is 
consistently significant and is positively associated with the DD measure. In our 
univariate regression, an unexpected fall in the house prices by1% may decrease DD 
by 0.37 standard deviations. 
 
Second, while short-term wholesale funding is negatively related to both the 
non-performing loan ratio and the measure of credit risk, these three measures of 
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BHC risk characteristic are negatively associated with the DD measure, making 
themselves significant driving forces determining the DD measure. Third, the two 
alternative measures of BHC activity diversification exhibit no consensus as the 
determinants of default risk. Non-interest income is positively related with the BHCs’ 
DD, which is on the contrary to both our expectation and some previous studies. This 
positive relationship exhibits the complexity of the examined BHCs. However, the 
off-balance-sheet activity, which is an important consideration of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
is negatively associated to the DD measure. Fourth, even if there is ongoing debate 
about whether capital requirements are a better tool for the management of systemic 
risk in financial institutions, the statistically significant results of our three alternative 
capital requirements suggest that they are significantly related with BHCs’ default 
risk, and hence can be used for evaluate BHCs’ financial distress. 
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Table 1 Variable Names and Construction 
Notes: The listed variables are used in our empirical study. All variables except the Housing Price Index and 
Distance-to-Default are taken from FR Y-9C forms. FR Y-9C is a regulatory report showing Consolidated Financial 
Statements of Bank Holding Companies. Our BHC data based on FR Y-9C are downloaded from the official 
website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The symbol within the brackets after each variable corresponds 
to the symbol shown in the regression results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable FR Y-9C Data Item or Sources
Alternative Regulatory Captial
Tier I Leverage Ratio (LEV) BHCK7204
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio (Tier I) BHCK7206
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (TRBCR) BHCK7205
Alternative Bank Activity Diversification
Non Interest Income Ratio (NIN) BHCK4079/(BHCK4079+BHCK4107)
Off-Balance Sheet Activity Ratio (OBSA) (BHCK3809+BHCK8766+BHCK8767)/BHCK2170
Control Variables
House Price Index (HPI)
All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States, downloaded from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USSTHPI/
Size (Size) ln(BHCK2170)
Short-Term Wholesale Funding (STWF) (BHCK2309+BHCK3353+BHCK2332+BHDMA243)/BHCK2170
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPLR) (BHCK5525+BHCK5526)/BHCK2170
Net Charge-Off Ratio (Credit Risk, CR) (BHCK4635-BHCK4605)BHCK3516
Dependent Variable
Distance-to-Default (DD) Derived from equations from (1) to (6) 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of All Dependent and Independent Variables for 
Our Selected BHCs 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables for our selected 
BHCs, during the periods 2003-2012, 2003-2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009-2012. Detailed information on all shown 
variables can be found in Table 1. All descriptive results are expressed in percentage, except Observations (Obs), 
DD, and Size. Distance-to-Default (DD) is derived in terms of equations from (1) and (6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable DD HPI Size STWF NPLR CR NIN OSBA LEV Tier I TRBCR
Obs 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288
Mean 4.93 1.21 15.43 0.09 1.36 0.55 0.21 0.45 9.35 12.57 14.25
Std. Dev. 3.43 5.84 1.55 0.08 1.66 0.84 0.15 3.23 4.07 5.88 5.68
Min -3.32 -7.05 13.82 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -1.01 0.00 -1.03 -1.44 -1.44
Median 4.73 -1.02 14.94 0.07 0.75 0.24 0.18 0.01 8.86 11.71 13.35
Max 36.70 10.61 21.58 0.69 19.63 9.38 0.99 52.72 72.92 99.74 99.91
Obs 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
Mean 7.37 7.85 15.42 0.10 0.42 0.17 0.21 0.32 8.85 11.80 13.48
Std. Dev. 2.63 2.50 1.51 0.08 0.37 0.24 0.13 2.31 3.71 5.92 5.70
Min -2.47 4.47 13.82 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 1.49 1.71 3.42
Median 7.11 6.71 14.93 0.08 0.34 0.10 0.19 0.00 8.44 10.88 12.45
Max 18.86 10.61 21.36 0.61 3.16 2.41 0.97 35.45 68.17 99.12 99.16
Obs 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230
Mean 3.21 -1.02 15.37 0.11 0.78 0.22 0.17 0.33 8.98 11.20 12.77
Std. Dev. 2.12 0.00 1.54 0.07 0.74 0.36 0.12 2.64 4.20 6.42 6.20
Min -0.40 -1.02 13.82 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 4.03 6.53 8.41
Median 2.82 -1.02 14.83 0.09 0.56 0.15 0.15 0.00 8.49 10.14 11.59
Max 15.66 -1.02 21.51 0.65 5.08 4.36 0.96 37.54 64.67 90.90 90.96
Obs 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Mean 1.19 -7.05 15.35 0.13 1.80 0.64 0.18 0.28 9.66 11.92 13.67
Std. Dev. 1.36 0.00 1.51 0.09 1.60 0.70 0.13 2.09 5.02 6.69 6.54
Min -3.32 -7.05 13.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 3.51 3.63 6.72
Median 1.22 -7.05 14.88 0.11 1.39 0.38 0.16 0.01 9.08 11.28 13.11
Max 5.93 -7.05 21.50 0.69 10.61 4.15 0.97 28.56 72.92 99.74 99.91
Obs 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 944
Mean 4.01 -2.37 15.48 0.07 2.27 0.95 0.22 0.64 9.83 13.78 15.46
Std. Dev. 3.16 2.18 1.61 0.07 2.00 1.09 0.17 4.18 4.04 5.24 5.05
Min -2.25 -5.26 13.82 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -1.01 0.00 -1.03 -1.44 -1.44
Median 3.75 -1.78 14.98 0.06 1.76 0.60 0.19 0.01 9.43 13.24 14.89
Max 36.70 0.75 21.58 0.62 19.63 9.38 0.99 52.72 67.63 97.16 97.29
2009-2012
2003-2012
2003-2006
2008
2007
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Table 3 Correlation between All Dependent and Independent Variables for Our 
Selected BHCs
 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables for our selected 
BHCs during the period 2003-2012. Detailed information on all shown variables can be found in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DD HPI Size STWF NPLR CR NIN OSBA LEV Tier I TRBCR
DD 1.000
HPI 0.630 1.000
Size 0.100 0.002 1.000
STWF -0.206 -0.018 0.257 1.000
NPLR -0.468 -0.448 -0.032 -0.005 1.000
CR -0.422 -0.363 0.039 -0.028 0.688 1.000
NIN 0.250 0.059 0.525 0.047 -0.165 -0.106 1.000
OSBA -0.036 -0.025 0.441 0.213 -0.040 -0.016 0.266 1.000
LEV 0.156 -0.085 -0.064 -0.145 -0.056 -0.067 0.311 -0.082 1.000
Tier I 0.160 -0.069 -0.050 -0.029 -0.055 -0.087 0.342 -0.012 0.880 1.000
TRBCR 0.164 -0.074 0.036 -0.020 -0.039 -0.061 0.383 0.019 0.877 0.987 1.000
Correlation Matrix
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Table 4 Univariate Regression Results for the Determinants of the Selected 
BHCs’ Distance-to-Default 
 
Notes: This table shows the univariate regression results for the determinants of the selected BHCs’ DD during 
the period from 2003 to 2012. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The year effect is controlled in 
the regressions. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant HPI Size STWF NPLR CR NIN OSBA LEV Tier I TRBCR
4.48 0.37
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** - - - - - - - - -
1.53 0.22
[0.032]** - [0.000]*** - - - - - - - -
5.75 -8.83
[0.000]*** - - [0.000]*** - - - - - - -
6.25 -0.97
[0.000]*** - - - [0.000]*** - - - - - -
5.87 -1.72
[0.000]*** - - - - [0.000]*** - - - - -
3.71 5.879
[0.000]*** - - - - - [0.000]*** - - - -
4.95 -0.04
[0.000]*** - - - - - - [0.082]* - - -
3.71 0.13
[0.000]*** - - - - - - - [0.000]*** - -
3.76 0.093
[0.000]*** - - - - - - - - [0.000]*** -
3.52 0.099
[0.000]*** - - - - - - - - - [0.000]***
2003-2012
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Table 5 Multivariate Regression Results for the Determinants of the Selected 
BHCs’ DD during the Period 2003-2012 
 
Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results for the determinants of the selected BHCs’ DD during 
the period from 2003 to 2012. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The Housing Price Index (HPI), 
size (Size), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and the measure of 
credit risk (CR) are the five control variables, the latter three of which show BHC risk characteristics. The 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative 
measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio 
(TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. The year 
effect is controlled in the regressions. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI 0.158 0.168 0.163 0.156 0.167 0.162
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 0.252 0.263 0.237 0.391 0.409 0.378
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -7.497 -8.369 -8.285 -7.240 -8.188 -8.093
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NPLR -0.268 -0.267 -0.270 -0.293 -0.291 -0.294
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CR -0.619 -0.595 -0.603 -0.648 -0.620 -0.630
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NIN 1.543 1.489 1.489    
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
OSBA    -0.071 -0.080 -0.079
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LEV 0.109   0.124   
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
Tier I  0.075   0.088  
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
TRBCR   0.078   0.091
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
_cons 2.498 2.401 2.638 0.622 0.397 0.691
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.243] [0.460] [0.192]
N 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288 2288
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.634 0.635 0.635
R² - Adjusted 0.631 0.630 0.631 0.632 0.632 0.633
F 261.54 260.75 261.14 262.83 263.29 263.57
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2003-2012
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Table 6 Multivariate Regression Results for the Determinants of the Selected 
BHCs’ DD during the Period 2003-2006 
 
Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results for the determinants of the selected BHCs’ DD during 
the period from 2003 to 2006. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The Housing Price Index (HPI), 
size (Size), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and the measure of 
credit risk (CR) are the five control variables, the latter three of which show BHC risk characteristics. The 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative 
measures of BHC activity diversification. Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio 
(TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. The year 
effect is controlled in the regressions. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI 0.214 0.169 0.162 0.243 0.195 0.185
[0.023]** [0.071]* [0.083]* [0.007]*** [0.031]** [0.041]**
Size 0.742 0.758 0.726 0.871 0.888 0.848
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -13.024 -14.584 -14.427 -12.870 -14.532 -14.350
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NPLR -0.774 -0.743 -0.765 -0.844 -0.808 -0.827
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CR -1.396 -1.212 -1.238 -1.326 -1.132 -1.165
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
NIN 1.024 0.995 0.905    
[0.184] [0.206] [0.249]
OSBA    -0.123 -0.125 -0.124
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LEV 0.149   0.159   
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
Tier I  0.088   0.095  
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
TRBCR   0.094   0.100
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
_cons -4.712 -4.302 -3.993 -6.686 -6.269 -5.843
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 879 879 879 879 879 879
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.369 0.365 0.367 0.377 0.373 0.376
R² - Adjusted 0.363 0.358 0.360 0.371 0.367 0.369
F 56.47 55.38 55.98 58.51 57.51 58.13
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2003-2006
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Table 7 Multivariate Regression Results for the Determinants of the Selected 
BHCs’ DD during the Period 2007-2008 
 
Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results for the determinants of the selected BHCs’ DD during 
the period from 2007 to 2008. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The Housing Price Index (HPI), 
size (Size), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and the measure of credit 
risk (CR) are the five control variables, the latter three of which show BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest 
income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC 
activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I 
leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. The year effect is controlled in 
the regressions. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI 0.227 0.228 0.228 0.216 0.219 0.219
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size -0.109 -0.091 -0.105 0.033 0.041 0.022
[0.054]* [0.116] [0.062]* [0.531] [0.440] [0.676]
STWF -3.289 -3.421 -3.394 -3.853 -4.019 -4.008
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NPLR -0.402 -0.398 -0.399 -0.474 -0.447 -0.453
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CR -0.462 -0.459 -0.464 -0.413 -0.420 -0.427
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]** [0.010]*** [0.009]***
NIN 3.330 2.945 3.098    
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
OSBA    -0.015 -0.018 -0.019
[0.652] [0.578] [0.565]
LEV 0.020   0.057   
[0.258] [0.000]***
Tier I  0.023   0.050  
[0.089]* [0.000]***
TRBCR   0.019   0.048
[0.170] [0.000]***
_cons 5.137 4.866 5.067 3.286 3.125 3.357
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 465 465 465 465 465 465
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.475 0.476 0.475 0.453 0.462 0.460
R² - Adjusted 0.467 0.468 0.467 0.445 0.454 0.451
F 58.97 59.41 59.14 54.15 56.09 55.50
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2007-2008
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Table 8 Multivariate Regression Results for the Determinants of the Selected 
BHCs’ DD during the Period 2009-2012 
 
Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results for the determinants of the selected BHCs’ DD during 
the period from 2009 to 2012. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The Housing Price Index (HPI), 
size (Size), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and the measure of 
credit risk (CR) are the five control variables, the latter three of which show BHC risk characteristics. The 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative 
measures of BHC activity diversification. Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio 
(TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirement. The year effect 
is controlled in the regressions. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI 0.684 0.670 0.673 0.681 0.665 0.668
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 0.070 0.075 0.043 0.188 0.211 0.180
[0.194] [0.167] [0.423] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -4.912 -6.036 -5.947 -4.288 -5.325 -5.243
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NPLR -0.248 -0.252 -0.255 -0.264 -0.269 -0.273
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CR -0.600 -0.548 -0.562 -0.630 -0.577 -0.593
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NIN 1.105 1.163 1.232    
[0.043]** [0.032]** [0.023]**
OSBA    -0.054 -0.067 -0.067
[0.006]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
LEV 0.142   0.150   
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
Tier I  0.114   0.123  
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
TRBCR   0.114   0.124
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
_cons 4.482 4.273 4.568 2.863 2.333 2.617
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.001]***
N 944 944 944 944 944 944
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.547 0.548 0.547 0.549 0.552 0.550
R² - Adjusted 0.543 0.544 0.543 0.544 0.548 0.546
F 125.31 126.00 125.42 126.16 127.82 127.03
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2009-2012
